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THE JURY SYSTEM UNDER CHANGING SOCIAL
CONDITIONS.
When we stop to theorize about our courts, we find no
room for the conception of a judicial tribunal which is not
perfectly unbiased and free to determine the facts as they
exist and to apply the law as it stands. But judicial tri-
bunals must be comlosed of men-with men's infirmities,
both mental and moral. No human tribunal can be infal:
lible in its judgments; but on the whole, no country has suc-
ceeded better than the English speaking people in provid-
ing for the just determination of causes-notwithstanding
the fact that reforms in judicial procedure are needed, es-
peciall in this country. Our judges command respect for
-their learning and judicial temperament. Respect for the
men has begotten respect for the office and that, in turn,
has caused the men to be selected with a view to their fit-
ness. This seems to be generally true. whether the office is
filled by appointment or by popular vote. And yet, in spite
of the general presumption that must exist in favor of a
judge's fitness to preside in the trial of causes, so jealous
is the law. in the administration of justice that there are
cases in which a judge, by reason of his relation to the par-
ties in the cause, or to the subject matter, is absolutely dis-
qualified from acting. In certain jurisdiction, were he to
insist upon performing the judicial functions in such a
case, the proceedings before him would be a nullity. In
other cases, the judge is expected to recuse himself if he
finds in his own mind a bias which might influence his rul-
ings. To the honor of our judges, be it said, this confidence
reposed in them by the law is rarely abused.
In the matter of juries, however, the framers of our judi.
cial system had a different problem to solve. Jurors come
and go, and are not subject to the powerful moral influ-
ences that help the judges to uphold the dignity of their
high position. Jurors can not be selected with special ref-
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erence to their fitness to sift out the truth from a mass of
conflicting evidence; for under our system this is not their
only function-they represent and are expected to voice
the average taste,, opinion and attitude of the community
with respect to a multitude of matters. In order to pre-
vent this difference in personnel between judges and juries
froin having a sinister effect on the trial of issues of fact,
our forefathers and ourselves have displayed much in-
genuity in devising means to produce a negative result,
i. e., the selection of a jury which shall not be subject to
improper influences, while having, in theory, at least, a rep-
resentative character. From the time that jurors are se-
lected by lot to the moment when they are sworn in, every
opportunity is afforded to litigants to weed out undesirable
material. And there are cases in which, at least under
State systems of procedure, when it appears reasonably
certain that an unbiasedjury can not be secured, a change
of venue may be had.
In the jurisprudence of our States, the change of venue
was inherited from.the common law of England. But in
view of the very tender regard which we have for persons
accused of crime, it is a curious fact that this proceeding
has as yet found no place in the Federal system of adminis-
tering justice.
In early days, the change of venue was a more con-
spicuous safeguard of personal liberty than it is now.
Communities were isolated, communication was scant; per-
sonal bias against an accused, might well spread itself
within a county and as well expend itself at county lines.
But in these days of dense population, it must be a com-
munity preserved in its last-century setting that can not
readily furnish a qualified jury, unless the case to be tried
be one that has aroused bias of more than a personal na-
ture against one of the parties.
The barrier to the change of venue in Federal practice is
probably insuperable. And it may well be that the very
conditions existing a century and a quarter ago, which
made the change of venue a prized institution of the State
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courts, made the proceeding an unnecessary one in the Fed-
eral courts, inasmuch as a Federal district comprised sev-
eral counties-in some instances, a whole State-and the,
jurymen mighf be drawn from the district at large.
The Federal Election Crimes, Act was passed in 1870,
and we know how bitter was the sectional feeling existing
at that time and for years afterwards, and the charges that
were made of the oppressive use of the Federal power dur-
ing the reconstruction period. It was in 1879, at a time
when conciliatory policies were beginning to get in their
work, that Congress amended the Judiciary Act with the
evident intention of taking the sting out of the Election
Crimes Act. Like many provisions that are simply com-
promise measures, this amendment went through as a rider
to an appropriation bill. It was intended to make the po-
litical complexion of all juries bipartisan; or, at least, to
prevent the drawing of any jury completely one-sided in
the political affiliations of its members. This provision is
as follows:
"And that all such jurors, grand and petit, including those summoned
during the session of the court, shall be publicly drawn from a box con-
taining, at the time of each drawing, the names of not less than three
hundred persons possessing the qualifications prescribed in Section 800
of the Revised Satutes which names shall have been placed therein by
the clerk of such court, and a commissioner to be appointed by the judge
thereof, which commissioner shall be a citizen of good standing, residing
in the district in which the court is held, and a well known member
of the principal political party opposing that to which the clerk may be-
long; the clerk and said commissioner each to place one name in said
box alternately without reference to party affiliations, until the whole
number required shall be placed therein."
Note the peculiar wording of the statute fixing the qual-
ifications of the jury commissioner: "A well known mem-
ber of the principal political party" opposed to that to
which the clerk of the court belongs. The act does.not call
for two distinct qualifications-that the commissioner shall
be well.known and that he shall be a member of the polit-
ical party opposed to that of the clerk. A man may be well
known throughout his district for business success or for
his philanthropy, or for anything unconnected with pol-
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itics, and he may at the same time be a consistent member
of a political party; but having kept his politics to himself
it may not be well known to what party he belongs. The
act obviously requires the court to appoint a man who shall
be well known as a member of a certain 'political party-
not a member of such party, .who for some reason has
achieved fame, or, it may be, notoriety in his district. The
distinction is important and should be borne in mind as
shedding light on an incident in our judicial history, the
details of which have never been made public, and which
I propose to relate for the purpose of showing how inef-
fectual a protection the statute may become in the very
crisis it was framed to meet.
The scene of this incident was one of the States which had
been put through the corroding process of reconstruction;
the year is immaterial; and the actors of historical inter-
est were the officials of the United States Circuit and Dis-
trict Courts.
During the previous year there had been a marked re-
crudescence of the animosities which had characterized the
bitter days of reconstruction, all through the South. While
*the hereditary citizens of this State had succeeded in re-
pressing the negro vote, a full casting and counting of
which would have changed the political complexion of
many counties and perhaps of the whole State, the peaceful
invasion of the South by the North had furnished the ma-
terial for a powerful office-holders' organization of the
Republican party; and, as many of the members of this
organization came from parts of the country where the
most up-to-date methods of practical politics were in
vogue, those sons of the State whose citizenship (and pol-
itics) came to them by inheritance were hard pushed to
maintain their supremacy. The seriousness of the situa-
tion can only be appreciated by reminding ourselves that
men act (as they must be judged) according as the condi-
tions appear to them. In this State there was now an or-
ganized body of men who were absolutely determined to
leave no stone unturned to restore the negro to the plane
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of political equality with the white man which was given
him by the Fifteenth Amendment. On the other hand were
those whose citizenship came to them by inheritance, who
believed with a strength of conviction that left no room
for argument, that the political equality of the negro
meant his social equality and political control, and these
two meant to the white man material ruin, degradation and
social chaos. Judged by their own feelings, standards and
convictions, they were at bay, threatened with the loss of
all that made life worth living and blinded with the des-
peration of men for whom all laws but one fade into mean-
ingless words when the instinct of self-preservation has
been aroused.
This was the situation in the Black Belt when the gen-
eral election of a year which I shall not mention was held.
To question the fact that the negro vote was'suppressed in
the Black Belt would be to ignore what at the time was not
only not denied, but was defiantly admitted. The immedi-
ate effect of these latest frauds on the ballot was to arouse
the Washington authorities. Orders were sent out to
prosecute all offenders against the Federal election laws.
The announcement that prosecutions were to be insti-
tuted added one more to the grievances of those whom I
call the citizens of the State by inheritance. It was the one
thing needed to enlist the sympathies and the co-operation,
if called for, of those who had looked askance on election
methods. The bad feeling that had existed before was in-
tensified by the threatened interference of the central gov-
ernment with what was considered the sacred right of the
State to manage its own affairs, and the atmosphere of the
whole State became charged with apprehension, malevo-
lence and potential violence.
In this state of bitter feeling, it is not to be wondered
at that sane judgment on both sides disappeared-that the
Republicans, almost to a man, looked upon every Democrat
as a presumptive violator of the law; while the Democrats
believed that every Republican was a member of an out-
rageous conspiracy to deprive them of the political control
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of the State by means of prosecutions in which the accused
would be denied the full benefit of the presumption of inno-
cence.
Then the judicial mill began to grind; and in making all
the orders that were passed, the D'istrict Judge Was the
one to act, except, as will appear, on one particular occa-
sion, when one phase of the prosecution was acted on, by
the Circuit Judge.
In those days the United States Circuit and District
courts had concurrent jurisdiction of all Federal crimes
not capital, with this important distinction: that a man
tried and convicted in the District Court could have his
sentence reviewed by the Circuit Court upon a writ of er-
ror, while, if he were tried in the Circuit Court, his sen-
tence was final in the sense that it could not be reviewed
by any other tribunal. It was doubtless assumed by the
framers of the old Judiciary Act that if the trial were had
in the Circuit Court, it would be presided over by both the
District Judge, as ex-officio judge of the Circuit Court, and
by the Circuit Judge, who would see to it that no errors
were committed, to the same extent that he could correct
errors sitting as appellate judge, were the trial had in the
District Court. The assumption was probably correct in
the early days, but at the time of which I am speaking the
great increase of business in the Federal courts had made it
impossible for the Circuit Judge to pay more than rare
visits to each Circuit Court in his circuit and then his time
was mostly taken up with admiralty appeals; so that as a
general proposition the work of the Circuit Court was
performed by the District Judge sitting alone.
The first move on the part of the government was to se-
cure an order discharging the then jury commissioner and
appointing a new one. Now, the old jury commissioner
was a man who answered the requirements of the law in
every respect-in letter and spirit. He was a Democrat,
active in party work and well linown as such throughout
the State; and he was, by election, and had been for many
years, the incumbent of the most lucrative public office in
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the State-clerk of the State court of general jurisdiction
in the principal county of the State. No man had ever been
heard to questionhis integrity. It is a singular thing that
no man of his day and generation ever hinted that he was
connected with any scandalous transaction in either pri-
vate or public life. And to complete his qualification, the
clerk of the United States Circuit and District Courts was
a Republican.
The new appointee came from a county in the Black
Belt. He had always been a quiet, unobtrusive citizen-a
member of the Democratic party, but he was absolutely un-
known outside of his own county until the State election
two years before he was made jury commissioner. At that
time he bolted the Democratic State ticket, headed an in-
dependent ticket in his own county and was elected, with
the help of such Republican votes as could be polled. Hav-
ing been elected, he made a great outcry that the Demo-
crats had cheated him out of 500 votes. It was this outcry
that brought him to the notice of the State at large. Com-
pare him with the man called for by the statute. The Ju-
diciary Act called for a well known member of the princi-
pal political party opposed to that to which the clerk be-
longed. The new commissioner never would have been
known at all outside of his own county had it not been for
his bitter denunciations, after the election, of the Demo-
crats and their election methods. These denunciations
helped to make "stuff" for the newspapers and he became
suddenly well known throughout the State-as a bolter
and as an active and vociferous antagonist of the Demo-
cratic political organization. But he called himself a Demo-
crat, and, once in the Assembly, he was admitted to the
Democratic caucus, although he was at the same time repu-
diated and denounced by the great mass of the party to
which he said he belonged; and it is safe to say that he
could never thereafter have received a straight Democratic
nomination to office without a new confession of faith and
profession of allegiance.
Now this appointment, standing by itself, would not be
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worth recording. It could not give rise to the slightest sus-
picion that the government was not desirous, in bringing
the threatened prosecutions, to give to the accused the ben-
efit of that liberal interpretation of laws enacted for their
protection, which is rooted in the Englishman's love of fair
play, and which we have inherited from the mother coun-
try. It is only in the light of what followed that the inci-
dent acquires any significance. But in the light of what
followed, it seems not unfair to conclude that it was part
of a well-devised and exceedingly ingenious plan to avoid
any mistrials.
The clerk of the Federal courts now furnished a contri-
bution in furtherance of the government's case. In the
District it had been made a rule of court that the jury
drawings should be made in public, in the court room, and
that the clerk should give notice of each drawing by post-
ing a notice on either the door of the clerk's office or the
door of the court room. The court room had been built
with three doors; one giving access to the clerk's office;
one at the rear, which was the public entrance; and one at
the side of the judge's bench. 'The last door was not used.
It was kept locked and the jury box was placed against it
on the inside. It Was no more the door of the court room
than would have been a trap door in the ceiling. But no-
tice of the jury drawing was posted on this door on a
piece of paper the size of a visiting card. The trick had
no merit of either ingenuity or novelty. " It was at least as
old as the tables of Caligula. Moreover, it was a perfectly
needless attempt to maintain secrecy where the law said
there should be publicity; for I never heard of any mem-
ber of the public attending a jury drawing, and if the no-
tice had been given in the proper place on a poster the
size of the court room door, it is probable that no attention
would have been paid to it. The manner of posting the
notice simply shows that the court officials preferred se-
crecy to publicity in the matter of drawing the jury, and as
evidence of a plan, of prosecution it may well be consid-
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ered in connection with the appointment of the new jury
commissioner.
The next man to lend a hand for the government was
the United States marshal. He wrote to a deputy marshal
stationed in another county the following letter upon one
of the printed letter-heads of the United States Marshal's
office:
'Sir :-You will at once confer with Mr.
and make out a list of fifty or sixty names of true
and tried Republicans from your county registra-
tion list for jurors U. S. Court and forward same
to Hon. ------- , clerk'U. S. Court, and it is nec-
essary to have them at once, as you can see.
Please acknowledge this. I am
Yours truly,
-------- U. S. Marshal."
The man with whom the deputy was instructed to con-
fer was chairman of the Republican Executive Commit-
tee in the deputy's county, one of the very few counties in
the State in which there was at that time a large propor-
tion of white Republican voters. The marshal, in assum-
ing the duties of his office, had sworn to support the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States. Compare this let-
ter with the terms of the law requiring the names to be
placed in the box without regard to political affiliation, and
form an idea of how the marshal regarded party service,
however, questionable in character, as superior to his ob-
ligation as an officer.
The deputy was a most obedient officer. He conferred
with the chairman of the Ekecutive Committee and togeth-
er they agreed on fifty men as being "true and tried Re-
publicans," and the names of these fifty men he sent to
the clerk of the court, as was afterwards learned from the
deputy's letter, which the ,lerk' had absent-mindedly
placed in the files of his office instead of in the fire.
The records of the court showed that the drawing was
made pursuant to the notice which the clerk had hidden on
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the side door of the court room; but no one but the court
officers was ever found who could vouch for the truth of
the record. By one of those marvellous coincidences which
shake one's faith in the doctrine of probabilities, the names
of all the fifty "true and tried Republicans" came out of
the box.
.It was necessary to draw twenty-three names for the
grand jury and thirty-six names for the petit jury panel.
When the drawing had been made, it was found that the
grand jury consisted of twenty-two true and tried Repub-
licans and of one ]one Democrat who would not even have
the privilege of making a minority report; while the petit
jury panel of thirty-six men consisted of thirty-four "true
and tried" and of two Democrats. It was at once appar-
ent that with four peremptory challenges at the govern-
ments's command, it could in any case, at least until the
panel was exhausted, tender to any accused an entirely
partisan jury, whereby the object of the statute was utter-
ly defeated unless the court could be induced to quash the
venire.
The government now applied for and secured two orders
of an extraordinary nature. They were extraordinary,
not because it was unlawful for the court to make them,
but because the application for them, taken in connection
with securing the appointment of the new jury commis-
sioner pointed in no uncertain way to an intention to stack
the cards.
It was ordered that all indictments found at the ap-
proaching term of the court shouldbe returned to the
Circuit Court, and that -all criminal cases. should be tried in
the principal city of the district.
As I have stated, the Circuit and District Courts had
concurrent jurisdiction of all crimes not capital; but up to
this time all such cases had been tried in the District
Court, thus giving to the accused the opportunity for a writ
of error in the, event of conviction. As we have seen, the
great majority of trials in the Circuit Court were pre-
sided over by the District Judge sitting alone; and the ef-
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feet of this order was to deprive the accused of the possi-
bility of a writ of error and to make all rulings of the Dis-
trict Judge incapable of review. That the righi of an ac.
cused to a fair trial, if his trial were presided over by a
judge who might be dominated, however unconsciously to
himself, by political c6nsiderations, would thus be jeopard-
ized, is perfectly apparent.
This district consisted of three divisions, court being
appointed by law, to be held at the principal city before
mentioned, and at two others. The object of the law wasto
serve the convenience of suitors and to enable persons ac-
cused of crime to be tried in the division in which the crime
was committed, that being generally the division of the
residence of the accused. But the law did not direct that
they should be tried in the division nearest to the place of
residence, or of the commission of the crime, nor was there
any provision in the Judiciary Act for a, change of venue
from one Federal court to another, even in the same dis-
trict. Fortunately this defect in the law has been partially
remedied in the new Judiciary Act, which went into effect
last January. It ca n not be said, therefore, that the second
of these orders violated the right of any of the persons
who expected t6 be indicted for crime. But taken in con-
nection with the secret application for an appointment of
a new jury commissioner, and the .way in which that com-
missioner measured up to the statutory standard, the trick
by which the public failed of notification of the jury draw-
ing and the way in which the jury actually was packed, it
strengthened the growing conviction throughout the State
that the government was determined to bring crtain men
to trial before a jury chosen according to the "true and
tried" standard, and presided over by a judge, of whose
rulings it felt reasonably sure in advance. And in this con-
nection it should be recalled that there was no provision
of law by which a Federal judge could be forced to retire
on account of bias and allow another to act in his place.
The new Judiciary Act has changed this also.
Shortly after the government had finished its prepara.
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tions, court convened, and the grand jury began to hand up
indictments. One of the defendants, who was held to an-
swer the charge of conspiring to prevent by force and in-
timidation the 'holding of an office of trust under the
United States, challenged the array of grand jurors on the
ground that the new commissioner lacked the statutory
qualifications. The court found the facts as I have already
given them, specifically pointing out that the commission-
er while in the legislature had "acted with" the Demo-
crats. The decision practically was that a man was a mem-
ber of the Democratic party if he called himself such, that
he need not be "dyed in the wool" and that his political
beliefs made him a "member" of the party and not his
standing with the other members. There being absolutely
no question as to the fact that the clerk of the court was a
Republican, the commissioner was held to be a well known
member of the principal political party opposed to that to
which the clerk belonged, and the challenge was overruled.
But the interesting and instructive part of these pro-
ceedings began when one of the defendants filed special
pleas in abatement and among them one attacking the act-
ual drawing of the jury. This plea was to the effect that
the jury commissioner and the clerk, in selecting names
to be placed in the jury box, from which the grand jury
which found the indictment against the defendants was
drawn, did not comply with the law, and select names with-
out regard to party affiliations, but did select such names
with regard to the party affiliations of the persons selected.
The government demurred to these pleas.
By a curious coincidence, on the day set for a hearing on
the'demurrer, the Circuit Judge appeared on the scene and
took his seat on the bench.
In an opinion rendered by the Circuit Judge, the Dis-
trict Judge concurring, it was held that all the pleas were
bad in substance and presented no matter of which the
defendants had any right to avail themselves; but as to the
particular plea attacking the selection of the grand jury,
the court held that it was equivalent to a charge that the
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jury had been packed for political purposes and while it
could not avail the defense, it was enough to put the court
on inquiry. The district attorney was ordered to traverse
this plea with a view to a hearing thereon, Having ren-
dered this decision, the Circuit Judge left .the city, and the
District Judge was left to deal with the remainder of the
case alone.
Issue having been joined in accordance with the direc-
tion of the Circuit Judge, the case came on to be tried the
next morning before the District Judge without a jury.
The first witness called was the deputy marshal. Coun-
sel for the defense offered to prove by him that he was a
deputy marshal; that he had received from the marshal
the letter which I have quoted, and that he had obeyed its
instructions, and the letter was produced and offered. But
the court refused to admit this evidence unless it should
first be shown that there had been collusion between the
marshal and the clerk and that the clerk had been privy
to, sending the letter. Counsel for the defense then pro-
duced a paper found among the court records purporting
to be a letter to the clerk containing a list of names to be
used in selecting the jury. The lower end of the sheet, in-
cluding the signatures of the writer, had been torn off. It
was offered to be shown by the witness that this was his
letter to the clerk in obedience to the orders of the mar-
shal. The judge then shitfed his ground and ruled that
this testimony was irrelevant, holding that Republicans
were not incompetent to serve as jurors, and it must be
shown that the clerk put the names in the box because they
were those of Republicans. This ruling drove the defense
to its last stand, and thie offer was made to prove by the
clerk that he had put the names contained in the deputy
marshal's letter in the box because it had been represented
to him that they were the names of Republicans. But
without any objection being made by the government and
before the clerk had time to claim a personal privilege, the
judge interfered and said that he would not permit the
clerk to be examined because the clerk was the virtual de-
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fendant in the proceedings and he would not permit the
clerk to be asked any questions that might tend to crimin-
ate him. It was then proposed to put the marshal on the
stand and to prove the facts by him. The court simply for-
bade this without giving any reason. At this point the
court adjourned for the day.
It will be noted that the court had been called upon to
rule on three points of evidence: the competency of the
marshal's letter, the admissibility of the deputy marshal's
letter, and the privilege of the court officers.
When the Circuit Court opened the next morning, the
District Judge announced that he had given the matter
careful consideration over night and had decided to call
the marshal to the stand. The, marshal was sworn and the
judge put to him this question: "Did you write the letter
to your deputy after anything on the subject of the letter
had been said to you by the clerk?" The answer was,
"No." And then, in spite of the most clamorous attempts
on the part of the defense to examine the witness farther,
the court absolutely refused to permit another question to
be put. The judge said that the matter was concluded as far
as the witness was concerned and that he could stand down.
The defense had nothing further to offer and the plea was
overruled. This was a judicial finding by the court that
the officers of the court had not been guilty of improper
conduct in the matter of selecting the grand jury-that the
grand jury had not been packed for political purposes.
One of the most significant facts in connection with this
bit of judicial history was the way in which the judge put
a single question to the marshal and accepted as conclusive
an answer that was absolutely inconclusive. Indeed the
marshal's answer, standing alone, was nothing less than a
negative pregnant. The issue was one of collusion between
the marshal and the clerk to stuff the jury box with the
names of Republicans. If there was collusion it might
just as well have taken place after as before the marshal
wrote the interesting letter to his deputy. Hence the de-
nial that there had been any collusion before the letter was
.80
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written was inconclusive. The marshal's denial may have
been perfectly true, and yet, non constat but that he wrote
the letter and before mailing it showed-it to the clerk and
came to an understanding with him as to what should be
done with the names of the fifty "true and tried" after
they were received.
The ruling of the court left the general impression that
the whole scene in which the examination of the marshal
was set had been carefully rehearsed over night, and it
served to intensify the impression of the defendants and
their sympathizers that in this case justice was not as se-
curely blindfolded as she was traditionally supposed to be.
We are not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the
accused in these extraordinary proceedings, nor with their
fate. We are only concerned with the situation that arose
under the law-or rather in spite of the law. As a matter
of fact, after a couple of convictions had been secured and
two deputy United States marshals had been shot in the
execution of process, and a majority of the white popula-
tion of the State had worked itself up to a 'pitch of excite-
ment bordering on armed rebellion, a fire destroyed the
records of the court and the government concluded to drop
the pending prosecutions.
If in time of peace it is well to prepare for war, how
much more ought we in times of quiet and mutual good-will
and confidence to adopt all reasonably demanded safe-
guards of the integrity of our judicial proceedings, and es-
pecially to strengthen those safeguards that we received
from the mother-country
It does not make for righteousness nor for the cause that
lies at the foundation of all constitutional government that
a judicial decision reach the very right of the matter in
controversy, when all the proceedings leading up to the de-
cision were distinctly unfair in appearance. Those who
approved of the action of these court officials argued in
this way: "Crime has unquestionably been committed. The
guilty men should be punished. But if they are tried by a
VOL. XLVII. 6
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jury selected in the manner which Congress has deemed
necessary to fairness, it will be impossible to convict them;
for in the present state of excitement and general unrea-
son, every case would result in a mistrial." No exception
could be taken to this reasoning up to this point. But the
conclusion was drawn thus: "Therefore, in order to make
possible the conviction of guilty men, it is permissible to
draw the jury in a mode forbidden by law, as long as the
jurors drawn are not themselves incompetent to act-we
must fight the devil with fire." This line of argument is
the only possible justification for lynch law. Indeed, it is
impossible to point out the difference in principle between
lynch ,law and such intentional violation of law as char-
acterized these prosecutions. In both cases, the object is
to meet a condition of crime that the law is powerless to
cope with.
I want it distinctly understood that I am not throwing
stones at any of the officers of the court. They did not act
for personal gain. . They felt themselves fully justified in
what they did.' They acted under the obsession of a dom-
inant idea, and that a political one. They were convinced
that the future of the republic and the happiness of its peo-
ple depended upon the suppression of Democratic frauds
upon the ballot. The morality of what they did no more oc-
curred to them than it occurs to us now to question the
morality of a certain destruction of private property in
Boston Harbor. They acted in accordance with what they
supposed to be a higher duty than that imposed upon them
by the Judiciary Act, just as their political opponents had
acted, as they supposed, in obedience to the law of self pres-
ervation. Such doctrine in practice is subversive of gov-
ernment; but we can not fasten on its holders the moral
obliquity of the man who commits crime for the sake of
personal gain.
The defects in the Judiciary Act, in so far as it provided
for the trial of persons accused of crime, were:
First, that it denied to an accused the right to have his
conviction reviewed upon writ of error. This defect in the
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law has since been remedied. And yet had the right to a
writ of error existed, it would have availed these defend-
ants nothing so far as their attack on the grand jury was
concerned (assuming the ruling of the Circuit Judge to
have been correct), for an inquiry into the mode of select-
ing the jury was not a matter of right in the defendants,
but was required as a matter of public policy to vindicate
the dignity of the court.
Second, in providing that juries should at least not be
intentionally of one political color, Congress doubtless in-
tended to give defendants bread, but as the gift has been
construed it became a stone, for they were given no right to
make the observance of the statute a sine qua non of an ir-
reversible conviction. This defect remains to the present
day.
Third, there was no provision for a trial in the. division
of residence or of the commission of the crime, nor for a
change of venue, nor for compelling a change of trial judge
on account of bias. The new Judiciary Act offers a slight
protection in the way of a change of venue from one di-
vision to another of the same district. It also provides that
an accused may file an affidavit that the judge has a per-
sonal bias or prejudiee against him, with a view to a sub-
stitution of -judges, but as the affidavit must state the
grounds for the charge, and as political bias or prejudice
is a very different thing from a personal feeling, it would
seem that, for the same reason that the attack on the "true
and tried" jury .was not sustained, such an affidavit would
be unavailing in a like case. The act, however, has made
one important change by providing that all prosecutions
for crime shall be had within the division in which they
were committed unless transferred upon the application
of the defendant.
But in spite of the new safeguards afforded by the act
of March 3, 1911, the same situation with regard to the se-
lection of the jury that arose in these prosecutions is liable
to arise again; for there are times when whole communi-
ties work themselves up to such a pitch that few individuals
HeinOnline  -- 47 Am. L. Rev. 83 1913
47 AMERICAN LAW REVIEW.
retain their perfectly sane judgment as to matters arising
out of the cause of the excitement. Now, at such times, if
the excitement arise out of such conditions as I have de-
scribed, the effect of a faithful observance of the law in
the selection of the jury will not be a fair trial of an ac-
cused, but a disagreement of the jury-at least that is the
only substantial benefit that an accused could derive from
such observance. To say, therefore, that an accused has
the right to a bipartisan jury in any case where it would
benefit him is to say that he has a right not to be convicted,
and this makes a dead letter of the Federal statutes-
something that is not conducive to respect for the law. It
stands to reason that under ordinary conditions, juries,
even in political trials, may be trusted to render their ver-
dicts regardless of their political affiliations. But if the law
is. permitted to remain as it is, the day will come when the
government will feel as it did in these cases, that political
affiliations are an essential part of its case. That this
scandal may not be repeated,. the law ought to be amended.
How ought this to be done? It may be admitted that the
obstacles in the way of a change of venue to another State
are insuperable. It has been suggested that the accused be
given the privilege of selecting from the circuit the judge
who shall preside at his trial. Naturally, he would select
one of his own political persuasion. If an accused had this
right in political prosecutions, at least he would have the
assurance that the intention of the framers of the bipartisan
jury provision would be carried out. But this would be no
more than insuring the accused against conviction. Or, a
simple provision that a failure to observe the directions of
the law in the selection of the jury should be ground for
challenge without a showing of damage and that a jury of
uniform political complexion should be prima facie evi-
dence of a violation of the law, would give the accused this
insurance. But the policy of having a crime on the statute
book coupled with a provision practically depriving the
statute of the law's sanction is one that ought to be con-
demned. In my judgment it would be a great deal better
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to repeal those sections of the Federal criminal code mak-
ing election offenses in the States crimes against the United
States, allowing all such offenses 'to be dealt, with by the
laws of the several States. Under all ordinary conditions
State justice can be trusted to deal with such cases with
firmness and wisdom. The objection to this is that in such
a crisis as I have described, State prosecutions might be
entirely one-sided. But it would be far better to allow the
State authorities to fail to prosecute for political reasons
than to see the United States officials packing juries, or
persecuting with conviction practically barred-for pros-
ecution without expectation of conviction becomes persecu-
tion. And should there ever be a threatened use of the
machinery of the State courts to oppress political oppon-
ents, there will always be the ample protection now af-
forded to an accused of removing the trial of his case from
the State to the Federal court.
The complications of. modern life were undreamed of by
our forefathers. -Not only have social conditions changed
amazingly since the jury was developed from a body of com-
purgators, but we now live in the shadow of a threatened
vast social upheaval the premonitory symptoms of which
are recurring with increased frequency. The champions of
utterly divergent social ideas are surely organizing and
-marshalling their forces. As yet the outbreaks of these
forces have been localized; but within the radius of their
action, their effect in arousing class passions has been suf-
ficiently marked to show what we may expect when a class
sense of injustice shall produce an upheaval nation-wide
in extent. They have also sufficiently proved the ease with
which, in such times of moral stress, by a sinister control
of the court machinery juries, may be secured whose ver-
dicts can be depended on regardless of the evidence.
Please understand that I am not voicing a fear for the
stability of any of our institutions, least of all for that of
trial by jury. All that I wish to point out is that changing
social conditions call for additional precautions just at the
advance of science makes necessary additional precautions
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against burglars. The jury system is the most stable of
our institutions. It will weather social changes and out-
last constitutions. But a wise man who owns a fine old
mansion does not allow it to become defaced by the rav-
ages of time; he does not allow its condition to become dan-
gerous from lack of replacement of parts; nor does he leave
the windows and doors open to the inroads of trespassers
and thieves. Why should such a highly prized institution
as the jury system be allowed to suffer from neglect?
Lawyers built the Temple of Justice; the lawyers are its
natural guardians, its high priests, and the people look to
them to keep the structure in the best of repair and to pro-
vide it with all the modern improvements that advancing
intelligence indicates and changing social conditions de-
mand. Unfortunately, too many lawyers forget that their
professional responsibilities do not begin with retainer and
end with honorarium-are not confined to the duties they
owe directly to their clients. Their duties as guardians
of the Temple they leave in great part to be performed by
politicians, and the result is that the Temple is not as har-
monious a structure as it ought to be.
There are certain reforms which ought to be made in
order to bring the efficiency of the jury systeina up to pres-
ent day requirements. All of these reforms can be brought
about by an aroused sense of responsibility among the
members of the Bar. The reforms are bound to follow.
In the first place it should be borne in mind that the in.
creased diffusion of education, bringing a higher average
of intelligence which has raised the quality of our juries,
has developed the skill of those who, taking advantage of
the general respect for the forms of law, stand ready to
pervert these forms for their own sinister ends. The small-
er the number from which juries are drawn, the easier it
will be to obtain by devious methods juries which are not
fairly representative. The social conditions of today have
raised questions of portentous import which threaten at
every moment to become acute, to arouse blind passion, and
to array class against class. 'It is in such a crisis that un-
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representative juries can be made the instruments of tyr-
annous oppresion. Therefore, legislation should be di-
rected toward enlarging the jury lists to the utmost prac-
tical extent and to placing in the box the full list of names
except of those who are excusable by reason of service with-
in a limited time.
In my judgment an example of vicious legislation in this
regard, full of potential wrong-doing, is found in section
277 of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1911, which would
permit United States District Court juries to be drawn
from a single county of the district.
But more important still is it that jury drawings should
become public functions in fact as well as in law. The only
way to bring this about is for the lawyers to make it part
of their business to attend and scrutinize the drawings.
Why leave the officials designated by law to meet in an
empty court room and make up their own record with no
one to verify it? We do not allow election returns to be
made up in that way. If the drawings were made from full
lists and were in fact public we would get rid of the round-
ers who, in almost every county, appear on the panel term
after term to the exclusion of more competent men who
should be forced to serve.
I have only spoken of what seems to me a lack of pre-
paredness of 'the jury system to meet a possible storm, the
mutterings of which have come to us in louder and louder
tones from PNnnsylvania and Illinois and Idaho and In-
diana land Massachusetts-a storm which, if it comes will
bring wide spread danger to life, liberty and property. It
remains for me to speak of an anomaly in our administra-
tion of justice whose baleful effect on the trial of issues of
fact is becoming more and more obvious. I refer to a large
part of the body of our so-called rules of evidence, and par-
ticularly to that rule which excludes hearsay testimony
a rule subject to several explicit, and in some cases, utterly
arbitrary exceptions.
For the purpose of convicting one accused of homicide
we admit the dying declaration of the alleged victim on the
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theory that the declarant's realization that he is about to
die takes the place of the sanction of an oath, and we dis-
pense with cross-examination from the necessity of the
case. But with stolid inconsistency, We reject the theory
and deny the necessity when ithe dying confession of an-
other is offered to save the accused. To limit the admissi-
bility of deathbed statements as to relevant or material
facts, to what are technically called "dying declarations,"
lacks, in these modern days, the merit of common sense.
The rule which excludes the self-serving declarations of
a party to the suit unless they are a part of the res gestae,
but admits his declarations against interest, conforms to
the ordinary judgment of mankind; but that can not be said
of the rule as to the declarations of a party not in interest,
since deceased. Upon an issue of curtesy, we exclude the
declaration of the accoucheur as to the birth of the child,
if coupled with a charge entry for professional services, but
admit it if coupled with a credit entry. Is there any sound
reason why the admissibility of such evidence should be
made to depend on the fact that the declaration was made
against the pecuniary or property interest of the declar-
ant? Men of sagacity do not frame their judgments in the
most important affairs of lifeby any such arbitrary rule.
Forgetting that "rumor is a pipe blown by surmises,"
we go to -ho other extreme in proving character and insist
that it must be shown by reputation, denying that the opin-
ion of a witness formed from personal acquaintance af-
fords any legitimate basis from which the jury could draw
a conclusion as to character.
We have some equally arbitrary and wholly artificial
rules of exclusion in the matter of proving pedigree.
This is not a fair way to treat a twentieth century jury.
We demand that a jury shall do justice by applying aver-
age human judgment to the issues; but at the same time
we withhold from them facts essential to reach a judg-
matical conclusion, thereby, you may say, blinding them in
one eye and depriving them of all sense of perspective.
The present day jury is no longer the body of presum-
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ably ignorant men for whom, we are told, these rules of
evidence were formulated by the judges centuries ago be-
cause their minds were so untrained that they were incap-
able of making nice discriminations as to the weight of
testimony.! This is to say that the rules of evidence have
not kept pace with the development of the jury idea and
with changing social-conditions. In early days these rules
were mere rules of procedure and they still remain so, tech-
nically. But they have acquired all the force of substantive
law, calling for legislative action, since we apply them in
cases which do not require the intervention of a jury.
The conclusion of the whole matter is that while Bar
Associations and legislative committees are giving heed to
the demand for a reform in judicial procedure, they should
also turn their attention to measures tending to safeguard
jury trials, in view of impending social crises, and admit-
ting that the intelligence of juries has kept pace with gen-"
eral social advancement.
NEW HAVEN, CONN. JOHN WVURTS.
'Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin, 21 Yale Law Journal, 105, (Dec. 1911).
HeinOnline  -- 47 Am. L. Rev. 89 1913
